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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS
(continued)

1. Ms. MASON (Canada) said that in view of the financial constraints facing the Organization and in line with the Chairman's suggestions on the need for greater efficiency in the work of the Committee, instead of delivering a statement or providing an executive summary of it, she would merely recommend that all delegations read the statement by Canada, the text of which had been circulated for that purpose. She drew particular attention to the last four pages of the text, which described Canada's initial and favourable reaction to the Chairman's proposal to reform the agenda of the Committee.
2. Mr. BAICHORAU (Belarus) said that with the events of the past four years, the very concept of security had changed to encompass economic, ecological and humanitarian aspects. In that connection, he endorsed the approach for guaranteeing international peace and security outlined by the Secretary-General in his report "An Agenda for Peace". The Government of Belarus was currently looking into the possibility of sending troops to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations and believed that the United Nations could and should be the cornerstone for the new system of international security.
3. Moreover, it was clear that poverty was a catalyst for all kinds of conflicts. By assisting countries in solving their economic problems, the international community could make a decisive contribution to global security, in line with the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era".
4. Priorities in the field of disarmament should be the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an end to the production of fissionable material. His delegation intended to submit under agenda item 57 a draft resolution on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons which it hoped would be adopted by consensus.
5. It was important to strengthen all aspects of non-proliferation regimes. Belarus would support any measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of technology used to manufacture missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore, it intended to circulate as an official General Assembly document, on behalf of the Republics which had emerged from the former USSR, a declaration on the subject. In the declaration the countries concerned indicated their willingness to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and apply IAEA safeguards to their nuclear activities. They also expressed their support for the indefinite extension of the NPT and chemical and bacteriological disarmament as well as strict controls on the export of equipment or technologies which might be used for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. As a result, Belarus hoped that the unnecessary limitations on the export of new technologies and similar trade restrictions imposed on the successor States of the former USSR would be lifted in the near future.

(Mr. Baichorau, Belarus)

6. Having acceded to the NPT, ratified the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I) and its Protocol and signed an agreement with the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of strategic forces, Belarus had effectively renounced the possibility of having nuclear weapons on its territory. It therefore felt entitled to demand additional guarantees from the Nuclear Powers for its national security. It was also grateful to those States which had offered technical assistance for dealing with the consequences of having nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.

7. He expressed satisfaction at the number of countries which had already signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, and hoped that it would enter into force in January 1995. The regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction might also be strengthened by establishing an appropriate verification mechanism.

8. The issue of regional disarmament and confidence-building measures should be examined in a broader context and a more pragmatic fashion. By eliminating the huge stockpiles of armaments left behind by the armed forces at the former Soviet Union, Belarus could make an invaluable contribution to strengthening regional and international security. However, in its current economic situation, it was unable to shoulder the enormous financial burden that process would entail. He therefore appealed to the developed countries to assist Belarus in that task, so as to meet the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and cause minimum damage to the environment. Belarus agreed on the importance for confidence-building of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and had already submitted information to the Register.

9. In order to enhance the multilateral process of disarmament and ensure that the United Nations continued to play a unique role in international peace and security, better coordination among the different bodies involved was required. In that connection, Belarus supported the proposals for broader and more balanced membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Likewise, it endorsed the proposal aimed at rationalizing the work and reforming the agenda of the First Committee.

10. Mr. KOVANDA (Czech Republic) stressed the growing importance in the post-cold war era of all disarmament activities, which he hoped would strengthen not only global security but also the stability of individual regions. Despite the remarkable achievements of recent years, the practical implementation of disarmament agreements was progressing too slowly and proving as formidable a task as that of negotiating new treaties. He therefore welcomed the interest shown by a number of countries in facilitating the implementation of the START I and START II Treaties. He applauded the unprecedented measures adopted by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in handling the sensitive security issues involved, which augured well for future cooperation in the area.

11. The Czech Republic made its own contribution to the implementation of disarmament treaties, for instance by receiving and conducting on-site

(Mr. Kovanda, Czech Republic)

inspections under the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Furthermore, a National Preparatory Commission had recently been established in Prague with a view to ensuring the timely ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That already difficult task was complicated by the process of reform under way in the country which affected inter alia the chemical industry. However, every effort was being made to prepare the legislative and industrial groundwork for the earliest possible entry into force of the Convention, and the Czech Republic would welcome any opportunity to exchange experience on the subject with other States.

12. The Czech Republic wished to become a full member of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and considered that the most appropriate way to expand its membership would be to admit all interested countries. It was regrettable that so much time had been devoted to the question and yet no agreement had been reached, for there were other more important issues to be resolved. He welcomed the decision of the Conference to launch multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). However, the progress achieved so far could be thwarted by the one nuclear-weapon country which chose to ignore the will of the international community in that regard.

13. In his view, the continued moratorium on nuclear testing and a steady progress of negotiations were prerequisites for the indefinite extension of the NPT at the review conference in 1995. In that connection, he stressed the need to endorse the findings of the relevant group of scientific experts. The Czech Republic would continue to support the activities of the group and was willing to provide the expertise and facilities for future verification of the CTBT through seismic means. Apart from non-proliferation measures the nuclear-weapon States should provide security assurances vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States prior to the review conference. He shared the concerns of other delegations regarding the growing risks of legitimate activities which might lead to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The problem should be addressed by increasing transparency in military activities and encouraging the work of specific groups or regimes in particular areas. Czech legislation was currently being amended to bring it into line with the activities of such groups, and his Government's long-term policy was for the establishment of a universal and non-discriminatory regime for the export of sensitive items and technologies.

14. The importance of conventional disarmament should not be overlooked. To that end, his country was committed to the further improvement of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and urged all Member States to submit their national reports without delay. As to the Biological Weapons Convention and the general recognition of the need to take a closer look at biological research and its application, the former Czechoslovakia had agreed to provide information on its laboratories and to take other measures aimed at confidence-building. With regard to the latter, he stressed the importance of implementing the verification measures recommended by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (the VEREX process). In that connection, the Czech Republic intended to support proposals for the inclusion of verification provisions in the Biological Weapons Convention.

(Mr. Kovanda, Czech Republic)

15. The Czech Republic welcomed the proposal by the representative of France to review the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. With a view to attracting more signatories to the Convention, he recommended that the review conference scheduled for 1994 should be open to experts from all countries. In conclusion, his delegation was committed to fulfilling the mandate of the Committee as outlined by the Chairman, and looked forward to seeking appropriate solutions to the many urgent items on the agenda, including the issue of non-proliferation.

16. Mr. ZAHARAN (Egypt) said that the revitalized United Nations was playing its proper role in addressing regional conflicts, particularly through the deployment of preventive diplomacy. Where preventive diplomacy failed, however, peace-keeping should not be seen as an objective in itself but should be complemented by a realistic process of peacemaking and peace-building.

17. Egypt welcomed progress towards lasting peace in the Middle East following the signing of the agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on a declaration of principles. He drew attention, in that context, to Egypt's initiative for the establishment of the Middle East as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Egypt was encouraged by progress towards the conclusion of a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and hoped that the preparatory work would be completed in 1994.

18. Turning to the report by the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7), he affirmed Egypt's support for its conclusion that a globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament was now needed. Egypt had accordingly transmitted to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs its detailed reaction to that report.

19. With regard to the process of streamlining the work of the Conference on Disarmament, Egypt encouraged efforts to promote coordination among the existing disarmament forums and believed that the extensive experience gathered by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) would greatly assist the Conference in that task. Egypt hoped that a similar streamlining process would be reflected in the First Committee's 1993 resolutions, which should deal with each issue in a single unified manner, resulting in fewer but clearer resolutions, as compared to the longer and more repetitive resolutions produced by the clustering procedure.

20. Always a fervent supporter of a complete ban on nuclear testing, Egypt welcomed the new political will conducive to such an enterprise and hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) before the end of its 1994 session. Such a step would greatly promote the successful outcome of the 1995 NPT review conference. In that context, Egypt regretted the nuclear test explosion conducted by China earlier in October and hoped that it would be the last such test. It had been proved, however, that nuclear capability could be achieved without resorting to testing, and

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

universal adherence to a CTBT should therefore be coupled with universal adherence to the NPT. To that end, Egypt welcomed the recent announcement by the United States of new measures to tighten control of the transfer of fissionable materials and to promote an international convention to ban the production of such materials for military use.

21. The success of the 1995 NPT review conference would be significantly promoted by progress in achieving comprehensive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, sufficiently effective and credible to satisfy such States that the international community, and the five permanent members of the Security Council in particular, would react firmly to any use or threats of use of nuclear weapons against them. While Security Council resolution 255 (1968) had established the principle of such security assurances, its shortcomings necessitated the elaboration of a new framework, preferably leading to an international convention establishing comprehensive assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. On the important issue of transparency in armaments, Egypt believed that its scope should be widened to include all types of arms, including weapons of mass destruction and high technology with military applications. It therefore welcomed the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a positive step in the area of arms control but had reservations concerning the current form of the Register and believed it should be developed in accordance with the proposals submitted by Egypt and contained in document A/48/344.

23. While Egypt had joined the consensus on the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security, contained in document A/48/42, it regretted a lack of clarity in the text on certain important issues. It also regretted the failure to reach agreement on the issue of the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields and hoped that any agreements reached on the question would respect the principles of universality and transparency.

24. Mr. KATHAMBANA (Kenya) said that Kenya joined other non-nuclear States in calling upon the two major nuclear Powers to implement all their commitments under the recently signed START II Treaty. Nuclear disarmament efforts should also, however, involve the international community as a whole and, to that end, every effort should be made to ensure that the Chemical Weapons Convention achieved universal status at the earliest possible date.

25. Serious concern was also aroused by conventional arms, which not only affected the areas of conflict but had adverse overspill effects in neighbouring countries, as exemplified by Somalia, whose conflict posed a serious threat throughout the Horn of Africa. The issue of international arms transfers and controls should therefore be seriously reviewed, and the international community as a whole, particularly the manufacturing and recipient countries, should strive for greater transparency and accountability in that area.

26. While the recently introduced United Nations Register of Conventional Arms represented an important first step towards a new era in arms control and should be linked with United Nations work in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, it

(Mr. Kathambana, Kenya)

should aim to achieve transparency and confidence-building while taking into account the specific features of each region.

27. With regard to the CTBT, Kenya maintained that, while moratoriums represented a positive step, they were not a substitute for a multilateral and verifiable legal instrument in that area. Progress towards the CTBT would significantly contribute to a successful result of the 1995 NPT review conference, and Kenya hoped that a comprehensive test ban could be achieved by the time the NPT came up for extension. In addition, it believed that the Conference on Disarmament was the most effective multilateral forum for negotiations on a CTBT.

28. Effective international arrangements were urgently needed to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, and a regional approach to disarmament, taking full account of the specific conditions and problems of given regions, should be given close attention, particularly in view of the escalating conflicts in different regions of the world. Kenya attached particular importance to the establishment of zones of peace, which would enhance regional peace and stability and promote extraregional cooperation. Accordingly, it supported the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and reaffirmed its commitment to the 1964 Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

29. Mr. HON Zhitong (China) said that, instead of peace and prosperity, the end of the cold war had released previously submerged contradictions, which had grown into serious political, economic and social crises, frequently erupting into full-scale armed conflict. Peace and development could only be achieved through a new international political and economic order, based on peaceful coexistence and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, with a recognition of the diversity of the world and differences among States. Notwithstanding progress in the field of disarmament, the United States and the Russian Federation still possessed the largest and most sophisticated nuclear and conventional arsenals, and the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of weapons of mass destruction still remained remote.

30. On the issue of nuclear testing, he recalled the statement by the Chinese Government reiterating its principled position on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban and putting forward a number of suggestions (A/C.1/48/3). China had always supported the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive test ban; consequently, it had always exercised utmost restraint in nuclear testing, conducting a very limited number of tests. China would take an active part in the negotiations for a CTBT, with a view to concluding the treaty by 1996. At the same time, it believed that a pledge by all nuclear-weapon States to refrain completely from the use of nuclear weapons would be a more effective step towards the goal of non-proliferation. To that end, parallel negotiations should be conducted by all nuclear-weapon States on concluding an international convention on the unconditional non-first use of nuclear weapons and non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. For its part, when China developed its first nuclear weapons in 1964, it had undertaken that at no time and under no circumstances would it be the first

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(Mr. Hon Zhitong, China)

to use such weapons and that it would not use or threaten to use weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones. He stressed that, according to the relevant documents and resolutions of the General Assembly, the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals had a special responsibility for the realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

31. As a non-chemical-weapon State, China had welcomed the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention and had been among the first to sign it. It had always resolutely opposed the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and, to that end, had acceded to the NPT in March 1992. In addition, it actively promoted international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had formulated explicit regulations on its own nuclear exports, which included placing them under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

32. He stressed that current international arrangements banning certain types of weapons and controlling arms transfers should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, and not used by certain Powers to maintain military superiority. China also denounced the presumption of a certain State which had set itself up as a policeman of the world, yet flouted international law and norms of international relations on the pretext of enforcing the ban on chemical weapons. China joined the other developing countries in insisting that the current discriminatory export controls systems, established and manipulated by a small number of supplier countries, should be replaced by a fair and non-discriminatory non-proliferation machinery.

33. With regard to conventional weapons transfers, China had always exercised restraint and responsibility, and favoured the adoption of appropriate and practical transparency measures. At the same time, it maintained that such measures should not undermine the security of any country and should be formulated jointly by all States on the basis of equality.

34. China had consistently supported the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and welcomed the results of talks between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It hoped that those countries would continue their negotiations in a patient, flexible and constructive manner.

35. In addition, China attached great importance to the maintenance of peace and stability in its own region and, to that end, had held negotiations with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the reduction of military forces in the frontier areas and on relevant confidence-building measures in the military field. In addition it had concluded important bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation and India which would promote peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region as a whole.

36. Mr. LAMAMRA (Algeria) said that the Committee's annual general debate on disarmament and international security items had become a barometer of the international political climate. The new realities in the world could facilitate bolder and more decisive steps towards disarmament. The Chemical Weapons Convention, for the first time, banned a whole category of weapons of

(Mr. Lamamra, Algeria)

mass destruction in all stages of production. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must not be undermined by any unilateral action; it should lead as soon as possible to the conclusion of a treaty which would complement the NPT. Meanwhile, unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing must be scrupulously observed.

37. The continuation of the dialogue between the two major nuclear Powers was encouraging; the Vancouver Declaration, START II and the Lisbon Protocol should make it possible to achieve a significant reduction in strategic arsenals. However, those reductions would not suffice to protect mankind from destruction; all nuclear arsenals must be eliminated. Algeria called for further, more decisive steps to promote the advent of an international order which would be based not on supremacy in arms but on universal security. The global challenges of epidemics, natural disasters and underdevelopment could then be tackled in a spirit of solidarity. Disarmament must be viewed in global terms and negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban must be carried out in good faith in the Conference on Disarmament; furthermore, the ban on the production of fissionable materials must be combined with a ban on nuclear-weapons tests and other related measures to allow real progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

38. The nuclear disarmament process must also be pursued at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Measures must be taken to prohibit, in all circumstances, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against all non-nuclear weapon States; those guarantees must be embodied in a legal instrument which would be binding on all the nuclear Powers. Negotiations for the elaboration of such an agreement must be begun in the Conference on Disarmament. At the NPT review conference, a timetable would need to be drawn up of the stages leading to complete nuclear disarmament. A balance must be achieved between preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and providing for the transfer of technology for development purposes.

39. At the same time, the extension of the arms race to other areas, particularly outer space, must be prevented; all States possessing advanced space technology must make a commitment to stop all military activities as a basis for the strengthening of the existing legal regime.

40. Since international security benefited everyone, as many countries as possible should be involved in laying its foundations. With the growth of multilateralism and of decision-making by consensus, the need to enlarge United Nations bodies such as the Security Council or the Conference on Disarmament was clear. Algeria therefore supported the O'Sullivan formula for the admission of new members to the Conference on Disarmament, even though the negotiations could be more arduous as a result. The adaptation of the composition and working methods of United Nations bodies to respond to the demand for participation and transparency was one of the best guarantees of universal support for the results that were expected to be achieved.

41. International security was also the sum of all efforts to establish or strengthen regional security. Algeria was naturally concerned with the prospects of global, just and lasting peace in the Middle East which would

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(Mr. Lamamra, Algeria)

accord with the national rights of the Palestinian people, restore all occupied Arab territories, and make the Middle East a zone that was free from all weapons of mass destruction. Algeria was also keenly interested in the efforts to elaborate legal instruments for the denuclearization of Africa and the accession of the continent, with the support of the African States themselves and of non-African nuclear Powers, to the status of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

42. The development of the Mediterranean as an area of peace and cooperation was an essential objective of Algeria's foreign policy; although tensions had developed because of the disputes between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and certain other countries, Algeria was determined to work to develop partnership and shared responsibility in the security and development of the Mediterranean area. Common interests and the need for a dynamic balance in the socio-economic development of the two banks of the Mediterranean should be the basis for a strategic vision of the future taking into account all the constants and variables of interdependence.

43. Mr. RATNAM (Singapore) said that the dramatic progress achieved in global disarmament was not just the by-product of the end of the cold war but the result of a recognition that international peace and security could be achieved only by common efforts.

44. His delegation reiterated its concern about the continuing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It welcomed the accession of Belarus to the NPT and looked forward to the accession of other countries. There were disturbing signs that other States possessed or planned to develop nuclear weapon capabilities. The discovery of the scale of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme had served to deepen suspicions of the continued refusal of some countries to allow IAEA inspection of their facilities.

45. With the current preoccupation with peace-keeping, disarmament issues could be unjustifiably marginalized. Disarmament was both an objective in itself and a central component of any vision for a new world order. As immediate as the demands of peace-keeping were, the need to preserve and strengthen the progress achieved in peace building must be kept in mind.

46. In the post-cold-war era, a more complex pattern of international cooperation and competition in an increasingly regionalized world had emerged. Without the imperative of super-Power competition, the major Powers were turning inwards to deal with their own domestic problems. In their place, the United Nations was assuming the central role in maintaining international peace and security. However, the multiple and simultaneous crises across the world were straining the Organization's resources and, consequently, undermining its credibility. Recent developments in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly demonstrated that while the major Powers were supportive of United Nations efforts in those areas, their national interests also played a major part in their decisions to be involved. Creative approaches were needed to supplement and reinforce the role of the United Nations in preventing conflict, managing crisis and resolving disputes. The States concerned were best able to assess the necessary steps to build peace and strengthen regional cooperation in concert with the United Nations and the international community.

(Mr. Ratnam, Singapore)

47. In the Asia and Pacific region, where there were no comprehensive institutionalized mechanisms for dealing with peace, security and disarmament, regional organizations like the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were exploring ways and means of creating such structures in cooperation with the United Nations. In resolution 47/53 B, the General Assembly had endorsed the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. International recognition gave weight to the Treaty as the basis of a peaceful regional order, not just for South-East Asia but for the broader Asian and Pacific region. It also served as an example of how regional countries could contribute, in conjunction with the United Nations, towards the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter. In July 1993, ASEAN had established the ASEAN Regional Forum which, for the first time, brought together all the major Powers in one common forum with ASEAN countries and other regions to discuss political and security issues in the Asian and Pacific region.

48. Regional mechanisms would never be able to replace the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security; a coordinated approach was needed. The successful resolution of the Cambodian conflict had been the direct result of cooperation between countries in the region and the United Nations, and could serve as a model for such cooperation.

49. His delegation welcomed the Secretary-General's efforts to strengthen disarmament mechanisms, and strongly supported ongoing efforts to rationalize the work of the Committee; however, any such rationalization should be undertaken on the basis of consensus among Member States.

50. Mr. TÜRK (Slovenia) said that his delegation fully agreed that the Committee should consider its traditional agenda items within the broader context of international peace and security issues. In that connection, it was also important to reach agreement on the specific role of the General Assembly in efforts to be pursued with a view to preempting or containing any situation which was potentially dangerous.

51. The Charter provided a meaningful and largely underutilized framework for action by the General Assembly in the field of preventive diplomacy. Under Article 14, the General Assembly could recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deemed likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion delivered in 1962, had expressed the view that the General Assembly, in the effort to adjust such a situation, could pursue any measure short of coercive action (ICJ, Reports of judgments, advisory opinions and orders, 1962, p. 163). The Court had thus offered an important interpretation of the delimitation of the roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

52. The development of regional security mechanisms and the strengthening of cooperation between regional arrangements and the United Nations would help in evolving a comprehensive approach to international security. The agreement on cooperation between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reached earlier in 1993 was a good example of such cooperation and should be followed by further steps for more coordinated

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(Mr. Türk, Slovenia)

activity, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. Cooperation between the United Nations and CSCE would demonstrate the need to approach security issues at different levels and in different fields in a well-coordinated manner. In addition to action in such fields as disarmament and arms reduction, new initiatives should be launched in the field of preventive diplomacy and confidence-building. In order to address the root causes of potential conflicts, due attention should be given to issues of national minorities and to the elimination of human rights violations. Such an approach would require the mobilization of a variety of European institutions.

53. A comprehensiveness approach to international security would be meaningful only if it was accompanied by increased effectiveness of the relevant international institutions. His delegation supported the current efforts to pave the way to reform and enlargement of the Security Council while, at the regional level, it regarded NATO and its evolution as the core factor for peace, security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic region. It hoped that all European States would join the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and accept as soon as possible commitments which would prevent the emergence of threats to international security. The need to assure long-term stability in the Euro-Atlantic region would necessitate the admission of new members to NATO and the establishment of legally defined relations of partnership with other European States.

54. Disarmament measures, especially those related to weapons of mass destruction, transparency in armaments and arms reduction, constituted an important aspect of efforts to strengthen international security. His delegation welcomed the signing of START II and hoped that other agreements would follow that positive step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also welcomed the progress made towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and the decisions of Brazil and Argentina to accept IAEA safeguards. It hoped for similar positive progress in other regions and that IAEA safeguards would be made as comprehensive as possible. While his delegation supported the indefinite extension of the NPT, it believed that the success of the 1995 review conference would be greatly aided by progress towards a CTBT and comprehensive security assurances. The recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament regarding negotiations on such a treaty and by four of the nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear testing were encouraging signs from that point of view.

55. His delegation also welcomed the progress made in the context of the Convention on Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Committee for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Universal ratification of and adherence to the Convention was one of the most important objectives in the field of disarmament.

56. Transparency in armaments was an essential element of confidence- and security-building measures, and the Register of Conventional Arms represented an important achievement which created a solid basis for future work, possibly on transparency with respect to non-conventional weapons as well. His delegation hoped that next year a majority of States would exchange the information included in the Register. It also welcomed the organizational efforts of the Secretariat to prepare for the implementation of the Register and the

(Mr. Türk, Slovenia)

establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments created by the Conference on Disarmament.

57. His delegation firmly supported the enlargement of the membership of the Conference and hoped that a consensus on such enlargement would soon be possible.

58. Mr. SHAHID (Maldives) said that the renewed political will being shown in addressing issues such as disarmament, international peace and security, human rights and the environment, while laudable, should not be allowed to divert attention from the long-term goal of global disarmament. His delegation welcomed the signing of the START II Treaty and called on all parties concerned to take the steps necessary to bring the Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol into force at the earliest possible date. The imposition of a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing would be a key factor in helping to prevent the further proliferation and improvement of nuclear weapons. His delegation commended the United States, France and the Russian Federation for their decisions not to resume testing, and welcomed the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was, however, saddened by China's decision to break the de facto moratorium on tests, which was a serious setback in the continuing efforts for the early conclusion of such a treaty. His delegation welcomed the increasing acceptance of the NPT, by the international community, but was alarmed at the non-compliance by certain States with the IAEA safeguards agreements and the continued efforts of others to produce nuclear weapons. It called on those States to respect the principles of non-proliferation and the spirit of the Treaty and again called on all States to accede to the Treaty in order to make the non-proliferation regime truly universal. His Government's commitment to the Treaty remained unwavering and it would support its indefinite extension at the 1995 review conference.

59. It was also his Government's hope that with the positive changes taking place in the realm of nuclear disarmament, it would soon be possible to realize the goal of a nuclear weapon free zone in south Asia. However, it was too early to make specific proposals such as the convening of a conference on the subject; adequate consultations should first be carried out to narrow the gap between the different points of view. The Maldives was also firmly committed to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, but felt that only parts of the 1971 Declaration and some elements of the 1979 Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean were relevant in the light of recent developments. It shared the view expressed in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean that a step-by-step approach to the issue should be taken.

60. His Government supported the recently-concluded Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention, to which it had acceded early in 1993. It was alarmed by the continued acquisition and stockpiling of conventional armaments, and believed that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was a useful first step towards controlling them.

61. International peace and security were the concern of all countries, small, medium-sized and large alike, but the ability of those countries to face the

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(Mr. Shahid, Maldives)

challenges involved was markedly different. Small States which lacked adequate financial resources for the acquisition of arms and faced severe constraints in manpower were never in a position to provide adequately for their own security, and the United Nations remained the only guarantor of that security.

62. Mr. JARAMILLO (Colombia) said that the international community's strategy for the immediate future must be based on the principles of equality and cooperation in order to make the new order compatible with the goals of development and democracy for all. Effective control of the production and transfer of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction was basic to the attainment of those goals. Collective security depended on the open and transparent cooperation and commitment of all States, and could not be defined by a limited number of countries. Discriminatory and inequitable policies increased the risk of the uncontrolled production, development and proliferation of nuclear and conventional arms.

63. The political and economic arguments for responsibility in international arms transfers were obvious, but stress must also be placed on the humanitarian imperatives involved. The suffering of whole populations condemned to endure the devastating consequences of war must not be ignored. His delegation therefore planned to submit a draft resolution to the First Committee proposing that the subject be discussed by the Disarmament Commission in 1994.

64. It was cause for concern that the world's chief arms producers were permanent members of the Security Council; at the same time, however, it was a ground for hope, because those same States were in a position to exercise effective control over conventional arms transfers and in particular over the illicit trade in such arms, and they should not delay doing so.

65. It was also a cause for concern that reduction and control of conventional weapons in some regions might lead to their transfer to other regions. Arms transfers indeed constituted a source of high profits for some countries, but economic interests must not take precedence over humanitarian ones. A serious study of international transfers of conventional arms should be undertaken by both the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. The Register of Conventional Arms was an expression of the international solidarity and cooperation required for such a study, as well as a means of building the confidence required for general and complete disarmament. The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention was another demonstration of the understanding and commitment required, and the field of conventional disarmament should be approached with the same seriousness, commitment and resolve.

66. Although advances had been made with respect to nuclear disarmament, the danger of nuclear proliferation remained. Moratoriums were a step towards general and complete nuclear disarmament, but did not constitute an argument for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That subject must be examined at the 1995 Conference, which should consider revising the Treaty, for without such revision it would perpetuate a status quo which indefinitely postponed the possibility of mitigating the international military imbalance. The indefinite extension of the Treaty should be linked to real progress in

(Mr. Jaramillo, Colombia)

nuclear disarmament and particularly to the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS
General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

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FIRST COMMITTEE

9th meeting

held on

Friday, 22 October 1993

at 3 p.m.

New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Chairman:

Mr. von WAGNER

(Germany)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. SHRESTHA (Nepal) said that despite the ending of the cold war, the world was now passing through an unpredictable and unstable phase in its development. The profound changes currently occurring confirmed that international security could no longer be viewed exclusively in military terms. The challenge before the international community was to eliminate the non-military threat to peace and stability, which had economic, social, ethnic and environmental dimensions.
2. Welcoming the reduction in military spending, he said that the resources thus released could be used to further international cooperation to eliminate the root causes of conflicts and tensions engendered by economic and social deprivation, particularly in the least developed countries.
3. Noting that disarmament was a long-term objective that required painstaking negotiations over many years, he recalled some important achievements in the field of disarmament, namely, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles (INF), the Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I), the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Those achievements raised hopes for continued progress in disarmament.
4. In that context, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was of the highest importance. Welcoming the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on that subject, his delegation noted that efforts to amend the partial test-ban Treaty could constitute an important aspect of that process. An early conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban would greatly promote the success of the 1995 Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
5. His delegation commended the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of the Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security. The development of confidence-building measures was an important contribution to arms control and disarmament at the regional level. The United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament were important forums for promoting regional approaches to disarmament. His delegation agreed with the view expressed by the Under-Secretary-General that those Centres should play an important role in resolving the new challenges before the United Nations. Commenting on the activities of the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, which had already yielded results, he said that Nepal would continue to support the Centre in every way possible and urged other Governments and non-governmental organizations to do the same.

(Mr. Shrestha, Nepal)

6. His delegation appreciated the valuable assistance of the disarmament fellowship programme in training qualified diplomats and expressed satisfaction with the performance of the recently created United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. It also welcomed the Chairman's intention to continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness and streamline the work of the First Committee.

7. Ms. RIVIERA (Costa Rica) said that the recent developments in the field of disarmament called for renewed efforts by the international community. Negotiations and agreements in that field had been given new impetus which had strengthened the foundation for establishing a new world order based on peace, security and cooperation.

8. Regional disarmament was a priority that complemented efforts to ensure universal peace. She commended the work of the Security Commission in Central America which had been entrusted with defining ways of attaining regional disarmament with a view to concluding agreements in the field of security, verification and limitation of arms and armed forces in the region. At their eleventh summit meeting, the Presidents of the Central American countries had adopted the Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), in which the countries of Central America stated their intention to define a new regional security model based on a reasonable balance of forces and the strengthening of civilian government. Measures adopted to establish such a model were yielding positive results.

9. Her delegation was pleased to note the efforts of Nicaragua, which had greatly reduced the number of its military units and was implementing reforms and adopting laws to guarantee the subordination of the military to civilian government, was deploying efforts to disarm civilian groups and was destroying confiscated weapons. Her delegation commended the El Salvador agreements in which that country's Government had presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a plan for reducing its armed forces. Another important event was the agreement on "Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America", signed in Guatemala, which stipulated procedures for disarmament and demobilization and provided for members of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) to take part in the legal and institutional life of that country. All those efforts undertaken in Central America could lead to a process of gradual demilitarization, transforming armed forces there into less expensive and more effective police units which could be called upon to resolve the serious problems of security engendered by crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and the arms traffic. Furthermore, those efforts could promote projects in the field of economic and social development. The significant reduction in military spending could liberate substantial financial, economic, technical and human resources to be used for the expansion of social services.

10. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was an important disarmament mechanism at the international level, as it was aimed at ensuring greater access to objective and transparent information and promoting restraint where armaments were concerned. The Register could be expanded to include new measures that might regulate the production, sale, stockpiling, distribution, reduction, conversion and balance of arms and armed forces and also prevent

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(Ms. Riviera, Costa Rica)

illegal traffic in arms. It was essential to promote greater openness and transparency in relations between States by including in the Register objective information on States' policies, procedures and agreements at the national and regional levels in the aforementioned areas. Those elements could provide the basis for establishing a new model of international security which would promote a reasonable balance of armed forces and armaments and their reduction to a minimal level.

11. During the early 1990s, significant progress had been made in the area of nuclear disarmament. Costa Rica, which viewed the destruction of nuclear weapons as a major objective, commended the efforts of the President of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament had adopted the decision to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. It would be advisable for those two forums to coordinate their efforts.

12. Another measure which had given impetus to efforts to prohibit nuclear tests was the global moratorium on nuclear testing which was now being observed on a voluntary and unilateral basis by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom. Her delegation urged the international community to reaffirm its conviction that the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit that practice for all time was a priority goal and that such a treaty would provide an effective way to promote the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Her Government believed that the convening of the 1995 Conference of States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be of vital importance to the study of those aspects and it hoped that Conference would extend that Treaty for an indefinite period.

13. Educational and information-related activities in the field of disarmament were of particular interest to her delegation, on whose initiative the First Committee had adopted resolutions on the subject. That issue should be given greater attention, especially at a time when changes occurring in the world that promoted freedom, democracy, the respect and realization of human rights, disarmament and social development were creating the conditions for attaining that goal. The efforts being made by Member States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions of learning to maintain peace and disarmament by supporting the activities of the United Nations disarmament education programme not only strengthened educational and information-related measures in the field of disarmament, they also supported the processes of arms reduction and disarmament and related agreements at the regional and international levels.

14. Mr. NKURLU (United Republic of Tanzania) said that despite encouraging and positive developments, such as those in the Middle East and South Africa, international security was still fraught with danger. Unexpected conflicts which had emerged since the demise of super-Power rivalry had resulted in the use of arms and the expenditure of enormous resources for the destruction of human life and property. The objectives of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms would be defeated if the major producers of armaments did not curb the temptation to export conventional arms. It was thus an appropriate

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(Mr. Nkurlu, United Republic of Tanzania)

time to re-examine the arms control and disarmament machinery and to update it to the realities of the post-cold-war era.

15. His delegation welcomed the conclusion by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 session of the item on regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security and hoped that the role of the United Nations would be to strengthen the process of settling disputes at the regional level, taking into consideration the specific conditions and characteristics of each region. It was unfortunate that, owing to fundamental differences of perception between supplier and recipient States regarding the transfer of technology with military applications, it had not been possible to complete the item on the role of science and technology.

16. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention was a milestone in the process of eradicating weapons of mass destruction. It was to be hoped that when working out the modalities for the implementation of the Convention, the Preparatory Commission would avoid any ambiguities that might hamper the efforts of third-world countries to acquire material and technology for the development of their chemical industries.

17. At a time when the international community was on its way to implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention in an effort to eliminate one type of weapon of mass destruction, it was becoming increasingly difficult to justify the existence of nuclear weapons. It was absurd and contradictory for nuclear-weapon States to attempt to convince the international community that nuclear weapons had no military value while they continued to maintain massive stockpiles of nuclear warheads. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) was welcome. However, no information was available regarding the fate of the nuclear warheads resulting from the dismantled weapons. The existence of fissionable materials, enriched uranium and plutonium in the contemporary world, which was fraught with ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts, posed a continuing threat to international security.

18. The denuclearization of the African continent was an integral part of the vision of a nuclear-free world. That goal was now within reach, especially after the South African regime had announced the destruction of several nuclear bombs it had produced. In that regard, the United Republic of Tanzania called upon that regime to comply fully with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguard agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

19. His delegation attached great importance to the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would provide an opportunity for States parties to correct the inequities inherent in the Treaty's discriminatory articles which allowed acquisition and proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, while barring such action by non-nuclear States. His delegation urged that in the spirit of encouraging transparency, States that were not parties to the Treaty and non-governmental organizations be given observer status at the Conference. Where possible, decision-making during the Preparatory Committee sessions should be taken by consensus.

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(Mr. Nkurlu, United Republic of Tanzania)

20. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was the only viable means of achieving the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was a welcome and timely event that coincided with the special meeting of the Amendment Conference of the States parties to the partial test-ban treaty which, in the view of his delegation, was the best forum to promote a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty. It was much easier to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty than to negotiate a completely new instrument within the Conference on Disarmament. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was a crucial step in facilitating full compliance with the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. In that regard, his delegation fully supported President Francois Mitterrand of France in his appeal to nuclear-weapon States to ignore the recent explosion of a nuclear device and not follow suit, and it also supported appeals to the United States of America not to resume testing.

21. The goal of establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace remained far from attainment. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean had spent two decades of strenuous deliberations to achieve the goal enshrined in the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, but had made little headway thus far. In June 1993, it had reviewed new alternative approaches in conformity with General Assembly resolution 47/59, yet unfortunately, for the third consecutive year, some members of the Ad Hoc Committee had not participated in its work. As a country bordering on the Indian Ocean, the United Republic of Tanzania was concerned at the persistent external military presence in the region, which, given the improved international situation, was out of place.

22. Mr. PAK Gil Yon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that the end of the cold war had aroused new hopes, but international efforts to eliminate all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and realize complete disarmament still encountered numerous difficulties. Despite some success in the international community's efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, there was still a lack of evidence that complete nuclear disarmament would follow. The outdated thinking which justified the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to war remained unchanged, and the nuclear Powers had not expressed their political will to abolish those weapons unconditionally in accordance with the demands of a new era.

23. His Government's consistent position was that testing, production, stockpiling and the use of nuclear weapons should be banned and elimination of all nuclear weapons in all parts of the world completely eliminated. One of the most effective ways of achieving that goal was a general and complete nuclear-test ban. His delegation believed that the issue of eliminating nuclear weapons was not an issue of method and procedure, but was directly related to the will and determination of the nuclear States to dismantle all nuclear weapons unconditionally in accordance with the desires of mankind. The interest of the international community was currently focused on the question of extending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The purposes and substance of that Treaty should be fundamentally revised. The partiality inherent in it should be corrected so that nuclear and non-nuclear States could assume the same obligations, and the elimination of nuclear weapons should become one of its main objectives.

(Mr. Pak Gil Yon, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

24. Control and reduction of conventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, was a critical issue. His delegation was concerned over the fact that even after the establishment of the Register of Conventional Weapons the export of arms to the developing countries had not decreased, while the technologies of sophisticated weapons continued to be transferred, and that the Register, rather than strengthening confidence, was further encouraging the arms race. In order to make it conducive to confidence-building it should provide for the prohibition of arms exports and the registration and phased withdrawal of arms and equipment in other countries.

25. The democratization and independence of international society were prerequisites to ensuring international security, peace and disarmament. But the destruction of the balance of power after the end of the "cold war" had produced tendencies to the monopolization of world politics and the principles of equality and impartiality were still absent in international relations, as could be seen from the tendency to put pressure on small countries. All countries were equal, regardless of their size and level of development. The world could never be peaceful as long as the international community allowed super-Powers "privilege" in international affairs and permitted intervention into the internal affairs of other countries. His delegation therefore supported General Assembly resolution 47/60 of 9 December 1992, which reflected the interest of developing countries in strengthening international peace and security and democratizing international relations.

26. With regard to the question of strengthening United Nations peace-keeping activities, it was his delegation's position that unless the Security Council and the United Nations were restructured democratically any proposal regarding that issue would be meaningless.

27. The maintenance of peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region was at present a fundamental condition for the maintenance of world peace and security. It was the most unstable region and residues of the "cold war" still remained there. His delegation's position on the question of security in Asia was that the countries and peoples of the region must solve their problems through their joint efforts. Foreign interference with and influence on the region should be eliminated. No country should be allowed hegemony in the region. In particular, Japan should gain the confidence of the peoples of the region by fully repenting of its past and giving up its ambition to become a military and nuclear Power.

28. One of the products of the "cold war" was the "nuclear issue" on the Korean peninsula. The only realistic way of solving that issue was the opening of negotiations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States. Any attempt to frighten the people of the DPRK by putting pressure on them with the excuse of the nuclear issue was anachronistic. In the second round of the talks between the DPRK and the United States held recently the principles for the resolution of the nuclear and bilateral issues between them had been established as well as practical measures to implement those principles. The DPRK's proposal to replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light-water-moderated reactors was the expression of its deep desire to put an end to the suspicion that it had nuclear ambitions, and it had been recognized

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(Mr. Pak Gil Yon, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

by the United States as a part of the final solution to the settlement of that question.

29. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3390 (XXX) B of 18 November 1975, the "United Nations Command", which was a relic of the "cold war" on the Korean peninsula, should be dissolved. The Armistice Agreement should be replaced by a peace agreement. The United Nations should recognize that the time had come to put an end to that relic of the era of confrontation.

30. Durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula could not be separated from the question of reunification. In order to develop the North-South dialogue and bring into effect the "Agreement on reconciliation and non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges between the North and South", the outside interference and large-scale war exercises directed against the other party to that dialogue should be discontinued. That was the lesson to be drawn from the rupture of talks in the past. The whole process of achieving national reunification required that the Korean people should achieve national unity on the basis of the principle of independence. Differences in ideology, ideals and political systems of course remained within the nation, but those differences could be overcome easily on the basis of the nation's homogeneity. The 10-point programme for reunification put forward by President Kim Il Sung envisaged the establishment of a pan-national unified State in which the two regional governments of the North and South were represented on an equal footing; and the State should be an independent, peaceful, non-aligned and neutral one which did not lean towards any great Power. The creation of such a State would pave the way for ensuring peace, realizing denuclearization and disarmament and easing tensions on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK would continue its efforts to realize the country's reunification by promoting North-South dialogue in spite of the difficulties along the way.

31. Mr. BARBOSA (Cape Verde) said that deep transformations were continuing to take place in the world, such as the recently concluded agreement in principle between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the significant changes in South Africa. Unfortunately, however, together with those welcome changes there were also disturbing phenomena such as the spread of weapons and the eruption of armed conflicts. In his delegations's view, a new world order could only be established through a process of reflection and collective decision, the results of which should be in the interests of general progress. The dominant role in those efforts should be played by the United Nations.

32. After the initial period of enthusiasm and even euphoria brought about by the end of the "cold war", the task of strengthening international peace and security had become more complex and difficult. In view of the limited resources available to the international community, the accent should be placed above all on preventive measures and overcoming the conditions favouring instability and conflict. Clearing away those impediments was the necessary condition for more successful and more democratic development.

33. All the organs of the United Nations, including the First Committee, should help in defining the elements of progress and the negative factors in the

(Mr. Barbosa, Cape Verde)

interests of eliminating the latter and widening and deepening the former. His delegation considered the Chairman's initiative concerning the continuation and deepening of the efforts to rationalize the work of the Committee very timely and was prepared to take part in those efforts. The success of that undertaking would depend to a great extent on how the rationalization of the First Committee's work was envisaged. In his opinion, analysis of the proposal made in the "Agenda for Peace" to deal with the problems of disarmament in conjunction with the new realities indicated that the central task at present was to increase the significance of disarmament and the effectiveness of the work of the United Nations in that field. To take those goals into account in deciding how to rationalize the work of the First Committee was the key to success. His delegation had taken note of the statement by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs announcing changes in the relevant units of the Secretariat intended to strengthen their ability to deal with the questions of disarmament and international security.

34. In spite of the persistence of some negative factors, the arms control and disarmament process had continued to move forward in 1993. The signature by more than 150 countries of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the beginning of operations by the United Nations Organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons were important events. For the first time, the conditions were being created for the elimination of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. Another important factor was the increased responsibility of Governments as evidenced, in particular, by the adherence to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of several nuclear Powers which had not previously belonged to it, and the increase in the number of members of the Treaty to 160.

35. Other noteworthy achievements included the signing in January 1993 of the START-II Treaty, the mandate given by the Conference on Disarmament to one of its Ad Hoc Committees to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the consultations on the Amendment Conference of States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. With regard to biological weapons, his delegation was pleased to note that the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts had concluded that a verification regime was possible that would have a direct bearing on efforts aimed at convening an international conference on biological weapons in 1994.

36. As to Africa, Cape Verde was both relieved and gratified at the news of the dismantling of the nuclear reactors in South Africa following that country's accession to the NPT in 1991, as well as the safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA. The position adopted by South Africa and the placing of the nuclear material released as a result of the dismantling under total IAEA control - which, in the view of Cape Verde, should take place as soon as possible - would hasten the introduction of a legal regime that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa on the basis of the treaty already drafted.

37. He welcomed the progress made with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament in Europe with the conclusion of the Treaty on Open Skies, in Latin America along the lines of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and in Asia. It must be admitted, however, that there was still much to be done before all the obstacles would be overcome and that there were a number of inconsistencies which, in the

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(Mr. Barbosa, Cape Verde)

view of Cape Verde, were quite unacceptable and which must be resolved. For instance, it was extremely important that the international community should be able to guarantee the practical implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. Because of the number of difficulties that had arisen in the process of the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol, the START-II Treaty, the vital importance of which was generally recognized, had still not entered into force. His delegation hoped that such difficulties would soon be overcome. As the Gulf War and other relatively recent events had shown, the difficulties in ensuring effective monitoring of compliance with the NPT remained a matter of serious concern to the international community. It was important to adopt all measures aimed at strengthening the legal regime of the Treaty and ensuring compliance with it. Despite the progress made, which was reflected in the establishment by the General Assembly of the Register of Conventional Arms, much work still had to be done to ensure greater transparency in connection with that category of weapons.

38. Mr. JANSONS (Latvia) said that the preservation of Latvia's recently restored independence depended to a great extent on international security in the world as a whole and particularly in Europe. His country therefore paid great attention to issues relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, including disarmament matters. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remained the most important international legal instrument for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and Latvia believed that all States should comply with it. Latvia had no intention of possessing nuclear weapons and in principle supported the idea of an international convention on assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also looked forward to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995.

39. Latvia welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to entrust its Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to start negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. His delegation regretted that a nuclear test had been carried out recently by China, and hoped that would not prompt other nuclear-weapon States to resume testing. A major achievement, which testified to the interest of the international community in comprehensive disarmament, had been the completion and opening for signature of the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

40. Latvia considered transparency in armaments to be an extremely important confidence-building measure. In that regard, it welcomed the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms, and believed that its gradual expansion would help to promote greater trust among countries.

41. The situation in the world had proved that disarmament must be considered in the broader context of international security. In that connection, Latvia supported the expansion of cooperation between the United Nations and regional security organizations and arrangements. In particular it welcomed the granting of observer status to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). There could be no doubt that the regional organizations could play an important role in early warning and the proper evaluation of situations. However, it was essential to draw a clear distinction between regional arrangements based on the sovereign equality of member States and those mechanisms where domination by one member could significantly determine the

(Mr. Jansons, Latvia)

outcome of measures adopted to maintain security. It was important that regional arrangements of the latter type should not be assigned peace-keeping functions.

42. In 1992, CSCE and the General Assembly had done much to resolve the problem of foreign military forces stationed in the Baltic States. However, that issue, which had been included in the agenda of the forty-eighth session, should not be the concern of those States alone, since it affected the stability of the region and international security as a whole. The presence of foreign military forces in Latvia undermined its social stability and adversely affected its ability to comply with international conventions in the field of disarmament. No State could feel safe while foreign military forces were stationed on its territory, without its required consent. Latvia believed that the swift, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the Baltic States would make a significant contribution to the further strengthening of international peace and security in the region and throughout the world.

43. Mr. AL-ATTAR (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the experience of the cold war had shown that security could not be achieved through armaments, which merely served to undermine it. The only logical alternative was collective security through the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons, the strengthening of confidence-building measures and the reallocation of resources to development.

44. Despite the many obstacles that remained on the path to general and complete disarmament, there had been significant achievements over the past few decades, the most notable being the Convention on Chemical Weapons. At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris in 1989, the Syrian Arab Republic had been the first to make a formal proposal that the Middle East should become a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. Since his country believed that nuclear weapons were the most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction threatening international peace and security, it was in favour of consolidating and building on the success of the Convention on Chemical Weapons by concluding a similar multilateral agreement on the prohibition of the acquisition, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. In the post-cold-war era the international community was duty-bound to support genuine efforts aimed at the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons.

45. There had been high praise for the agreement reached in the Committee at the previous session concerning transparency in armaments and regional arms transfers. However, such measures could not be implemented in occupied territories, particularly when the occupying Power was capable of manufacturing and acquiring all types of weapons without any international control, while the territory under occupation was unable to receive the means for its self-defence, contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. A case in point was the Middle East, where Israel still occupied Arab territories and was impeding a comprehensive political settlement in the area. Moreover, Israel stubbornly refused to apply the system of IAEA safeguards to its nuclear installations and continued to develop and upgrade its nuclear programme, which was targeted at strategic points in the Middle East.

(Mr. Al-Attar, Syrian Arab Republic)

46. The main purpose of declaring the Middle East a zone free of all types of weapons of mass destruction was to relieve tension in the potentially explosive situation in the region caused by the continued occupation, to take practical steps towards disarmament which would extend to all States in the region without exception, and to enhance the prospects for the establishment of peace in the region. The initiative had, however, been rejected by Israel, which had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The arms race in the Middle East could be curbed only by the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. The relevant measures must be comprehensive and fair and must be adopted on a non-discriminatory basis, under the supervision of the United Nations.

47. The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament treaties, was daily becoming more important. The time had come to give serious consideration to the applications of States which had long sought membership of the Conference. His delegation hoped that the Conference would adopt the proposals on the matter before the end of the year and extend membership to those States which had applied. It welcomed the progress that had been made on nuclear testing at the latest session of the Conference.

48. The Syrian Arab Republic believed that the United Nations had a special role to play in all matters relating to disarmament. It hoped that specific measures would be taken to implement the provisions of the Charter in the interests of ensuring the sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic independence of States, putting an end to aggression and occupation, and securing for all peoples under foreign occupation the exercise of their right to self-determination and independence.

49. His country also believed it was necessary to enhance the efficiency of the First Committee by rationalizing its work. The Committee should devote particular attention to issues on which progress was possible. It should also undertake an overall scrutiny of all the draft resolutions before it and ensure their implementation.

50. His country had always supported United Nations resolutions and treaties on disarmament, particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which it was a party. In February 1992 it had signed a safeguards agreement under that Treaty. It was also a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and was ready to take part in any international efforts to eliminate all forms of weapons of mass destruction. It had high hopes for the establishment of a peace which would lead to the comprehensive and just settlement of conflicts throughout the world. It also looked forward to general and complete disarmament, genuine development for third world countries and the establishment of a system of international relations based on the primacy of international law, observance of the Charter, dialogue, conciliation and cooperation.

51. Mr. AL-BUAINAIN (Qatar) said that peace, security and disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes should be based on specific fundamental principles: peaceful coexistence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force. Due regard should also be paid to the right of all States to sovereignty,

(Mr. Al-Buainain, Qatar)

independence and social and economic development in accordance with the Charter and the provisions of international law. On that basis his country sought to ensure the incorporation of those principles into the life of its region.

52. Qatar welcomed the progress achieved in the Middle East peace talks, which it had supported since 1991. It also welcomed the agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel and hoped that it would lead to similar progress on every aspect of a comprehensive, genuine and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which would ensure the security of all parties. That might well help Israel to abandon its nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thus opening up the possibility of turning the whole Middle East region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Qatar believed that all the States of the region would accede to the Treaty, thus ushering in the start of a new era - an era of peace.

53. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would bring benefits to the countries of that region at the social and economic level, too. Those portions of State budgets currently allocated to arms expenditure and the maintenance of substantial defence forces could, if a state of peaceful coexistence prevailed, be directed to the development of the social and economic spheres in the interests of future generations. Although it was aware that the disarmament process was complicated, his country joined other States in calling for priority to be given to nuclear disarmament and hoped that during the last decade of the twentieth century it would be possible to achieve the elimination of all forms of weapons which threatened human survival. It also hoped that the process could be accompanied by other measures to increase transparency and openness. It supported the idea of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, but urged that special efforts should be devoted to limiting the use not only of nuclear weapons but also of other weapons of mass destruction.

54. Given its geographical position, Qatar attached particular importance to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Together with the other States concerned, it supported the idea that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean should examine the Declaration with an eye to the changes that had taken place in the world since the end of the cold war and should direct its attention to regional and global efforts to guarantee peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region, with particular emphasis on social and economic factors.

55. Mr. DE ACHA PRADO (Bolivia) said that, although the cold war and the ideological confrontation between East and West had become a thing of the past, there remained many crisis points in the world and new conflicts were flaring up, with the result that the task of maintaining international peace and security was made somewhat more complicated than had formerly appeared. In that connection, he pointed out the need to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security and as an appropriate forum for the achievement of the aims set forth in the Charter. The importance of that task had been underlined at the Seventh Presidential Meeting of the Rio Group, held recently in Santiago, Chile.

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(Mr. de Acha Prado, Bolivia)

56. Pointing out some positive trends that had appeared on the international scene, he none the less expressed his concern that military expenditure remained as high as ever in comparison with the resources allocated to health and educational needs, particularly in developing countries. With regard to the importance of achieving transparency in arms transfers, he said that tighter controls in that field were essential.

57. With the formation of a new system of international relations, it was becoming increasingly clear that the concept of international security also included elements not directly connected with security; he had in mind the interrelationship between peace, development and democracy. To ensure international security, therefore, it was necessary to take measures to eliminate the social and economic causes of instability.

58. With regard to successes in the field of nuclear disarmament, he noted the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to start discussions on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In that connection, he expressed the hope that, prior to the talks, the nuclear-weapon Powers would refrain from nuclear-weapons testing. Another important step in the disarmament process was the initiative taken by the United States of America to cease production of fissionable material.

59. With reference to the question of the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he said that the preparatory process for the NPT Review Conference should help to draw the various positions on the matter closer together, while the Conference itself should become the forum for the consideration of every aspect of non-proliferation.

60. With regard to the chemical weapons Convention, his country looked forward to its universal application on the basis of an effective and balanced verification system and called on countries which had not yet done so to sign the Convention as soon as possible.

61. His delegation attached great importance to the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. It therefore considered it essential that international cooperation should be developed in the use of scientific and technical achievements for the resolution of problems related to disarmament. It also supported the development of environmentally safe methods of weapons disposal and stressed the importance of international cooperation in biotechnology and in projects aimed at meeting health, agricultural and industrial requirements.

62. At the Seventh Presidential Meeting of the Rio Group, the Latin American countries had declared their commitment to the achievement of international peace and security and noted the need to reallocate resources from the arms race to activities promoting peace and development. They had called for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, stressing in that connection the success of the Latin American countries in achieving the full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and adherence to the chemical weapons Convention. Latin America should thus soon become a totally nuclear-weapon-free zone. His delegation considered it essential that similar zones should be established in

(Mr. de Acha Prado, Bolivia)

other regions. That would represent a significant step forward in the globalization of the disarmament process.

63. Mr. HAN Toe Sung (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation did not agree with the remarks of the representative of New Zealand at the previous meeting regarding his country and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which it considered lacking in objectivity and provocative. The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was exacerbated by the stationing of nuclear weapons in South Korea, the unfounded suspicions regarding his country's intentions and the unsatisfactory position taken by certain officials in the IAEA secretariat. The representative of New Zealand had consciously ignored that fact and he called on him to take an objective approach to the issue, and not consider the nuclear question in isolation from all other issues.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS
General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
10th meeting
held on
Monday, 25 October 1993
at 10 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman:

Mr. von WAGNER

(Germany)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Ms. WILLIAMS (Cyprus) said that her delegation shared the optimism expressed by other speakers with regard to progress in global and regional disarmament. As the Secretary-General had suggested in his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", the only way to ensure progress towards enhanced security was through a comprehensive approach. The role of the United Nations and in particular the Security Council had already been considerably strengthened. Regional institutions were also becoming more involved in improving mechanisms for strengthening security. Those developments provided a genuine opportunity for achieving a comprehensive approach to international security. The agreement on cooperation between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reached earlier in 1993 had already borne fruit in the reinforcement of mechanisms for crisis management and the negotiation of further security and arms control measures. That was a good example of a partnership which promised further progress.
2. Her delegation agreed with the Secretary-General that the time had come for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. The role of arms control and disarmament in the future would mainly lie in the field of preventive diplomacy and would be judged by their contribution to the elaboration of an effective conflict prevention strategy. That strategy would have to be based on two tenets of international law: the prohibition of the threat or use of force directed against the territorial or political integrity of any country, and the corresponding obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. The primary object of arms control agreements should be to make it more difficult to deploy aggressive military force. That should be done by constraining military activities; the more closely knit the system of rules became, the more difficult it would be to embark on aggression without violating obligations.
3. There could be no doubt, however, that a modern concept of security must be able to include legal, economic, social and ecological concerns. A lasting peace would only be established if all dimensions of security, including economic, political and human rights, were guaranteed. Her delegation pledged its active participation and support towards the attainment of those goals.
4. Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands), speaking as Chairman of the Panel of Governmental Technical Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, introduced the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (A/48/344). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there had been consensus in the international community that the world must avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons and that greater transparency would help to rectify misconceptions and enable nations to exercise restraint. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was the instrument for fulfilling that objective. The Register was not designed to assess the overall capabilities of States nor a measure for controlling arms

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

transfers, but expressed the political determination of Member States to enhance confidence among themselves.

5. The Panel of Governmental Experts established in 1992 to elaborate the technical procedures and make any adjustments to the Annex to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L necessary for the effective operation of the Register, and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register, had submitted a first report (A/47/342) to the General Assembly setting out a clear set of technical procedures for the operation of the Register and a standardized reporting form, and exploring possible further development of the Register. The Secretary-General's current report on the Register (A/48/344) had been compiled on the basis of the information on pertinent transactions relating to 1992 provided by Member States and summarized the replies of 80 Member States, including all the major arms suppliers. Eight more returns had been received since its preparation. The returns covered some 200 arms transfers, amounting to a significant part of the total number of legal arms transfers for 1992 in the categories covered by the Register. That could be considered a good and promising start.

6. The data available through the Register created transparency on conventional arms transfers and thus contributed to building confidence among States. Moreover, being Government-supplied, the data had official status. Information had been provided on arms transfers in each of the seven categories of the Register, and almost half of the returns included background information. The same proportion of States had submitted data on military holdings and procurement through national production, and many States had provided an insight into their national arms import and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures. It was another beneficial consequence of reporting to the Register that it might well cause some nations to do the necessary amount of internal soul-searching.

7. The returns to the Register so far, including the "nil" returns, were an expression of firm support for the concept embodied in the Register. They also provided highly relevant data. In that connection, he appealed for timely returns, as, in order to provide the maximum amount of transparency and confidence, the Register should be up to date.

8. Apart from their number, the quality of the returns required attention. There was, for instance, the matter of discrepancies evidenced by cross-checking the reported exports and imports of Member States. However, that aspect was not purely negative, as such mismatches indicated at least that returns were genuine, rather than preconcerted. Moreover, solutions to individual discrepancies could be found through consultations between the Member States concerned.

9. The initial performance of the Register was impressive. However, if it was to become a powerful factor for building confidence and trust among Member States, maximum participation in the form of returns, including "nil" returns, was a political sine qua non. Member States which had not yet participated in the Register should do so without further delay. Participation in the Register stimulated cooperation at regional and subregional levels, thereby contributing

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(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

to stability in all regions of the world, as was evidenced by the important regional and subregional initiatives that had already been taken.

10. The contents of the returns indicated that the functioning of the Register warranted qualitative examination, particularly with regard to the categories of arms transfers. Not all the returns conformed fully with the seven categories established for arms transfers, although for the Register to be objective and non-discriminatory its contents should be in full conformity with those categories and their definitions. In some cases, definitions might need further adjustment, for example, those of combat aircraft and attack helicopters, the threshold in the definition of warships and the definition of missiles and missile launchers.

11. Another more technical question was whether the standardized form for the reporting of arms transfers needed modification. For example, some Member States had anticipated the future development of the Register by using the standardized reporting form to submit information on their military holdings and on procurement through national production. The 1994 Experts Group might usefully address the phenomenon of discrepancies between returns, exploring whether means could be found to help reduce their number, for instance by the gradual harmonization of national administrative procedures. To that end, the experts might develop greater agreement on what constituted an arms transfer in terms of the Register. Attention should be given to those technical aspects of the Register in order to reduce inaccuracies and inconsistencies, the accumulation of which might undermine confidence and reinforce suspicions about intentions. Apart from those aspects, which concerned the operation of the Register in its present form, the 1994 Experts Group should consider the further development of the Register, for example, the possibility of reporting on additional weapons not currently registered or including more details on particular arms transfers. Of course, overloading of the Register should be avoided. Requiring less detailed reports in the first years of its operation might induce additional States to participate. It should also be borne in mind, however, that there was wide support among Member States for including in the Register relevant data on holdings and arms procurement through national production. Certainly, the Register could gradually be developed along such more ambitious lines, and might in due course evolve into the unique early-warning mechanism it had the potential of becoming.

12. A number of interesting thoughts and proposals on the present and future functioning of the Register had been put forward in 1993, for example, that States should begin exchanging information on military holdings and procurement through national production and that they should make an annual declaration to the United Nations on the size and organization of their military forces. The discussions within the Conference on Disarmament on that subject were quite promising.

13. Summing up, he said that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was well on its way to becoming the effective instrument for the strengthening of international security Member States had hoped to create. What was needed to bring it to its full capacity as such an instrument was the cooperation of all Member States in living up to their commitments.

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14. Mr. YATIV (Israel) said that the Middle East region had taken historic and dramatic steps towards peace and reconciliation as a result of recent developments at the International Peace Conference. Discussions at the Conference concerning the unique security situation prevailing in the Middle East had underlined the need to take into account the concerns and interests of all countries of the region in developing solutions to outstanding security problems. Consequently, confidence-building measures must take precedence over the arms control process in the region. For its part, Israel, had been pursuing confidence-building activities with its neighbours within the working group on regional security and arms control, which was part of the multilateral track of the Conference. The activities had included a workshop on verification held in Cairo, and workshops with extra-regional countries serving as mentors on communications-related confidence-building measures, search and rescue at sea, pre-notification and exchange of information on military exercises, and long-range objectives. Israel welcomed the progress made in the international talks, and hoped that Syria and Lebanon would join that important forum.

15. It had become clear in the wake of the Gulf War that excessive accumulation of weapons arsenals was a major source of instability in the region and that conventional weapons often caused no less destruction than non-conventional weapons. A special effort thus needed to be made to curb arms supplies to the Middle East. In that context, Israel supported General Assembly resolution 47/52 L concerning "Transparency in armaments", and had submitted information to the Register of Conventional Arms.

16. With respect to the question of chemical weapons, Israel regarded the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free region in the Middle East as an achievable goal and one of the main objectives of its foreign policy. In accordance with that position, Israel supported the goals of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and had been among the first group of States to sign the Convention in January of 1993. There was need for more general compliance with the provisions of the Convention, and its universality must also be guaranteed in terms of the right to membership in the governing bodies established by it.

17. While Israel supported the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had voted in favour of the NPT in 1968, it believed that an agreement regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which would be freely and directly negotiated among the States of the region, including mutual verification arrangements, would be a more suitable approach to eliminating nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Furthermore, it was Israel's view that the nuclear issue should be dealt with only within the full context of the peace process, as well as other regional security problems. Nevertheless, Israel supported the work of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT review conference.

18. Recent developments in the peace process provided an important opportunity to settle regional problems and to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East. However, matters of security could be settled only among the States of the region. The evolving situation must be used to enhance regional security by building confidence between States in the region and diminishing levels of suspicion and hostility. That process deserved all the support and

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(Mr. Yativ, Israel)

encouragement of the international community, and for that reason Israel welcomed the participation of States outside of the region in the multilateral talks on regional security and arms control.

19. Lastly, the dramatic changes taking place in the Middle East should lead to a reappraisal of the positions and resolutions of the United Nations in order to bring them into accord with the new realities of the region. For example, Israel believed that the agenda item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" should be struck from the agenda.

20. Mr. TAAPOPI (Namibia) observed that, given the recent accentuation of political, religious and ethnic rivalries, the failure to curb weapons of mass destruction would be a source of global instability. The nuclear States and the entire international community had a moral obligation to prevent their spread by concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) that was universal, verifiable, multilaterally negotiated and of indefinite duration, thus helping to halt the qualitative arms race and preventing other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Consequently, the recent decision of the Conference on Disarmament to instruct its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to negotiate such a treaty was commendable.

21. Namibia had signed, and was in the process of ratifying, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, a major breakthrough in arms control. It had also acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hoped that would augur well for the prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and it was making arrangements to join the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

22. In Africa, where violence and dialogue were the two extremes by which the degree of trust between States could be gauged, the issue of regional confidence-building was crucial. The Namibian Government had in February 1993 hosted a regional meeting on confidence- and security-building measures in southern Africa, which had proved useful in discussing issues common to the region and in dispelling mistrust. As further steps, outstanding disputes should now be settled by negotiation, regular meetings should be held among military officials of different countries, and information should be exchanged about military forces and activities within the region. The resulting confidence would allow armed forces to be reduced and resources to be redirected from military to civilian purposes. Owing to their debt burdens, the developing countries had not yet benefited from any peace dividend, and the industrialized countries must apply some of the benefits from disarmament to their development.

23. Mr. MEHR (Afghanistan) said that in view of the particular situation in the Middle East, his delegation would support any initiative aimed at averting the disastrous and far-reaching consequences of a nuclear war and urged all other nations in the region to do likewise by adhering to the NPT. In the post-cold-war era the concept of a nuclear deterrent was no longer a valid argument, and countries should focus their efforts on peacemaking, confidence-building measures and negotiations. In that connection, steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would strengthen general support for the extension of the NPT after 1995.

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(Mr. Mehr, Afghanistan)

24. Afghanistan had always supported the activities of the United Nations in arms control and disarmament, and recognized that the security of Member States could be guaranteed through compliance with the relevant treaties and conventions, particularly those relating to verification and transparency.

25. Afghanistan welcomed the opening for signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention and looked forward to its earliest possible entry into force. It also endorsed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a CTBT. With regard to the NPT, his delegation supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty and called upon all nuclear-weapon States to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing initiated by the Russian Federation and the United States. As to the question of military transparency, he stressed the usefulness of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and urged countries in his region to submit their reports without delay.

26. The possibility of a nuclear arms race in South Asia was a matter of grave concern. Negotiations between the countries concerned should be encouraged, and the possibility of a draft treaty for a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the lines of that agreed upon by the ASEAN countries should be considered. Moreover, the threat posed to global security by the build-up of conventional weapons should not be overlooked, hence Afghanistan's support for a resolution to control the production and sale of such weapons. Effective international action was required so as to place restrictions on the sale and distribution of conventional weapons and to bring an end to their illegal transfer. More important, a strategy should be worked out for collecting the illegally distributed weapons that were a source of instability in a number of developing countries.

27. His delegation attached particular importance to the holding of a review conference on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. It hoped that the Second Protocol to the Convention would be revised to make more adequate provision for the problems created by the widespread use of mines, which were felt so acutely in his country.

28. Mr. WAQANISAU (Fiji) said that small developing nations appreciated the fact that the powerful nations had taken the lead in seeking to foster international peace and security. The South Pacific Forum countries urged nuclear-weapon States to continue to negotiate disarmament and arms limitation treaties, on the premise that weapons must be understood as a threat to life rather than as tools of warfare to be used politically in the interests of security.

29. Fiji welcomed the current moratoriums on nuclear testing by France, Russia and the United States. The recent United States extension of its moratorium was a welcome relief to Fiji and the other island nations of the South Pacific, which had for decades been exposed to nuclear testing and which looked forward to a treaty that would codify a total and permanent ban on all testing. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiation of a CTBT was a historic development, and all nuclear Powers should participate in the negotiations.

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(Mr. Waganisau, Fiji)

30. Fiji, like other members of the South Pacific Forum, fully supported indefinite extension of the NPT. All negotiations on the transfer of high technology with military applications under the NPT must take into account existing non-proliferation treaties and arrangements. The recent initiatives by some Member States aimed at declaring the use of nuclear weapons illegal would not solve the proliferation problem.

31. On the question of transparency in armaments, Fiji supported the proposals to extend the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include the transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction. The Register, being low-key, incremental and long-term, had the potential to be an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy.

32. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Fiji had become a party, had been a significant step forward. Biological weapons, however, remained a global threat because of their dual use and because they could be produced relatively easily, cheaply and on a small scale, thus making them attractive to countries without a nuclear capability. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction had no provision for verification, and a conference should be convened to consider the report of the Third Review Conference of that Convention.

33. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements freely arrived at among the States concerned should lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and ultimately to a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. The major Powers should contribute to the indefinite extension of the NPT when it was reviewed in 1995, just as they should respect regional disarmament arrangements. Using the South Pacific, for instance, which under the Treaty of Raratonga had been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to dump nuclear wastes or as a thoroughfare to move nuclear materials was contrary to the terms of that Treaty and showed a blatant disregard for the wishes of States in the region.

34. It was obvious that science and technology were directly related to the economic and social development of countries, and the Committee must work with other disarmament agencies to issue viable guidelines and recommendations on the matter. The lead taken by the nuclear Powers in relation to a nuclear test ban, nuclear non-proliferation, the control of chemical and biological weapons and of nuclear waste dumping in the North Pacific augured well for the development of the island nations of the South Pacific.

35. Mr. TUN (Myanmar) observed that the propitious international political climate had favoured arms control and disarmament, prompting the conclusion of negotiations that had been going on for more than two decades. Among the most significant achievements was the decision in August 1993 of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT, which Myanmar had long advocated as a central disarmament and non-proliferation objective. It hoped that the Conference would be in a position to complete its work by the time of the review of the NPT in 1995. The timely conclusion of a CTBT would demonstrate the seriousness with which the nuclear-weapon States viewed the commitment they had undertaken as parties to the NPT.

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(Mr. Tun, Myanmar)

36. The Chemical Weapons Convention had already been signed by an impressive number of States, among them Myanmar. Yet the Convention was but a first step, and much more needed to be done to implement its provisions. The momentum must be maintained, and more States should accede to the Treaty in order to ensure a global ban on chemical weapons.

37. The prospects for nuclear disarmament had brightened considerably in recent years, since Washington and Moscow had at long last begun to rein in the unbridled nuclear arms race. The satisfactory implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the signing of the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I) and the agreement undertaken by the principal nuclear Powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals were encouraging developments. Moreover, the adoption of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) in January 1993, provided for the most sweeping nuclear-arms reduction in history.

38. Universal adherence to the NPT was a means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The remaining non-signatory States would be encouraged to accede when the nuclear-weapon States demonstrated their unequivocal commitment to negotiate in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. The success of the 1995 review conference would depend on whether all NPT parties believed that the five nuclear States had made sufficient progress to that end. Meanwhile, non-nuclear-weapon States must be given credible security assurances through legally binding guarantees against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

39. Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary) said that the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament had made remarkable progress, notably in its decision to commence negotiations on a CTBT. He expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on expanding the membership of the Conference before its next session.

40. He welcomed the growing interest in and recognition of the benefits of transparency in armaments through the success of initiatives including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Although the Secretary-General's initial report on the Register had indicated that reports had been received from less than half of the Member States, it was worthwhile noting that the information they provided, for instance on arms exports, covered more than 90 per cent of the global aggregate. In order to make the Register more representative, any geographical imbalances in reporting should be remedied and States whose statistics were likely to be of regional significance should be encouraged to submit their reports. Further contributions to the Register would enhance confidence-building not only worldwide, but also at the regional level. Moreover, while transparency in armaments should essentially be a cooperative undertaking, it should not preclude the possibility of unilateral action.

41. The reliability of the information provided was also an important aspect. To that end, he suggested looking into the possibility of establishing a monitoring or review mechanism along the lines of those set up for the purposes of other non-binding international instruments. One of the main objectives of transparency in armaments was to prevent any further deterioration in global security; however, international action for that purpose could not be taken

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(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

until a criterion for judging whether the amount of arms accumulated posed a serious threat had been established.

42. The growing interest in transparency in armaments had been amply demonstrated during the Conference on Disarmament through the numerous contributions provided by delegations. Regrettably, due to time constraints it had not been possible then, and apparently would not be possible in the near future to give the ideas put forward the consideration they warranted. For that reason, the Hungarian delegation considered that the topic should remain on the arms control and disarmament agenda, including that of the Conference on Disarmament, for many years to come.

43. With regard to the possibility of a CTBT, he welcomed the substantial progress made in the study of non-seismic verification methods, and looked forward to the resumption of negotiations on the subject the following year. Hungary had always been in favour of a total ban on nuclear explosions and therefore advocated the earliest possible conclusion of a CTBT, for it was not only global security but also the future of the environment that was at stake. A total ban meant that no distinction should be drawn between nuclear-weapons tests and nuclear explosions. Furthermore, the possibility of prohibiting associated preparatory activities, as well as assistance to other countries in conducting their nuclear tests, should also be considered. The planned treaty must be applicable to all States, regardless of whether they possessed nuclear weapons.

44. Experience had shown that the success of any disarmament agreement depended to a great extent on a proper verification system. Hungary considered that verification of the CTBT should be a technical rather than a political issue. Advantage should be taken of the strides made in technology to ensure a comprehensive and reliable verification system. It would largely be based on a seismic monitoring network, but should also be supplemented by non-seismic verification means in order to ensure the required level of confidence in States compliance with the treaty. A further and more detailed examination of the different aspects of the complementary verification techniques would be necessary with a view to their possible integration into a single system.

45. Such a system must meet three basic requirements. First, it must be technically effective in order to reveal potential non-compliance and act as a credible deterrent against prohibited activities. Second, it must be cost-effective and not entail heavy financial burdens for States parties. In that connection, the possibility of allocating certain responsibilities in the implementation process to IAEA might be considered. Third, the verification system should be as transparent as possible, with equal access to data guaranteed for all States parties. Lastly, a related problem was that of making political judgements on the degree of compliance with the treaty by States parties. A policy along the lines of that adopted in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be envisaged.

46. There was no doubt that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have an important bearing on other disarmament matters; for instance, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime would certainly benefit greatly from a

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. However, care should be taken to avoid creating an artificial link between the two areas. Experience had shown that the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the outcome of the CTBT negotiations could be seriously jeopardized if such an exercise were attempted. Moreover, although developments in the second half of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament augured well for swift progress during the 1994 session, the setting of an arbitrary deadline seemed to be premature. He was none the less confident that the Conference on Disarmament would rise to the challenge and complete its work successfully.

47. Archbishop MARTINO (Observer for the Holy See) said that the warfare, brutality and atrocities scarring many regions of the world provided a shocking contrast to the achievements in the disarmament field in the wake of the cold war. In the absence of strong world mechanisms for peace, a nefarious arms trade continued and arms production was excused, even encouraged, for economic reasons. The lack of political machinery for peace had its origins in the lack of a shared awareness of the repercussions of social injustice caused by the demands of powerful States in a world of finite resources.

48. He welcomed the Committee's decision to combine its debates on questions of disarmament and international security and called on all Committee members to act more energetically in pursuit of the goals of disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes, more balanced development of the world economy. He also welcomed the strategy described by the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Peace of combining the elements of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building, and called upon all States to make participation in and support for international peace-keeping a part of their foreign and national security policies.

49. With regard to the question of nuclear weapons, he congratulated those States which had participated in the moratorium on nuclear testing and called upon the Committee to take up as its goal implementation of a permanent, global ban on nuclear testing by all countries in all environments. That goal must be met in time to ensure the successful extension of the NPT in 1995.

50. Fresh insights into the intellectual foundations of nuclear deterrence policies in the wake of the cold war showed that nuclear-arms reductions were not sufficient to guarantee security. After the collapse of communism as an international force, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the United Nations peace-keeping and peacemaking machinery, the world community was confronted with the challenge of moving to a post-nuclear form of security based on strengthened international law. In that regard, he noted that the NPT complemented the United Nations Charter by addressing the problems of the atom and development. In essence, the NPT promised a world in which nuclear weapons would be eliminated and technological cooperation for development would be widespread. However, in recent years a widening gap had emerged between the promise and the performance of the world community, and quinquennial reviews of the Treaty had become confrontational. Successful extension of the NPT beyond 1995 would depend on the compliance of near-nuclear States, which were increasingly dismayed by what they considered to be the deception of the nuclear Powers. For their part, the nuclear Powers bore the responsibility of stopping the development of nuclear weapons before the

(Archbishop Martino, Observer,
Holy See)

technology would become available for use in regional conflicts. In any case, it was possible to reduce the discriminatory nature of the NPT through such measures as a comprehensive test ban.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.